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Abstract
This paper attempts to reconcile the empirical evidence with the argument
in favour of a positive effect of homeownership on exit rates from unem-
ployment, known as “Oswald’s thesis”. While the theory would suggest that
homeowners experience more difficulties than renters to exit unemployment
due to lower residential mobility, the empirical literature has typically found
lower unemployed duration for homeowners. Taking into account some of
the reasons for the falsification of the Oswald’s thesis, we provide evidence
which supports it.
At first, in a theoretical model of endogenous job search we show that
homeowners’ higher moving costs imply unambiguously lower search and
lower job finding rates, even though an opposite effect works for jobs which
do not require a move. Then, in the empirical analysis we make use of data
drawn from the British Household Panel Survey to compare job search inten-
sity measures by housing tenure. We find that, controlling for housing costs
and for different residential statuses, non-employed outright owners have def-
initely a lower attachment to the labour market than renters, and that this
effect is even more evident when we compare them to private renters.
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1 Introduction
During the nineties Andrew Oswald1 studied the relationship between the
unemployment rate and the homeownership rate for OECD countries and he
argued that homeownership was one of the major culprits of high unemploy-
ment given the observed strong positive correlation. The most influential
microeconomic interpretation of this finding has focused on the supposed
lower job finding rates of unemployed people who own the home. In fact,
since homeownership hampers propensity to move for job reasons, homeown-
ers should have longer unemployment durations than otherwise comparable
renters2While there is abundant evidence supporting the first element of this
rationale3, several empirical studies have found no support for the second,
and in most cases even the opposite, that is lower unemployment durations
for homeowners4.
The existing literature5 has provided two possible explanations for this
paradox. The first one looks at the different effect of mobility costs on
job search behaviour between the local and the non local labour market.
The second has focused on the importance of making distinctions among
homeowners, in particular between mortgage-holders and outright owners,
and among renters, in particular between social and private renters, since
results can be very different by subgroups.
With regards to the first explanation, Munch et al. [2006] point out that
the lower propensity of owner-occupiers to move for job reasons does not
necessarily imply that they have lower exit rates from unemployment. In
fact, homeowners may have higher reservation wages for jobs which require
a residential move, but also lower reservation wages for jobs which do not,
so that job finding rates in the local labour market may be as high as to
offset the lower rate for jobs in a distant area. Whether or not the total job
finding rate is lower for homeowners is just, they argue, an empirical matter
which depends on the magnitude of these two opposite effects. However,
Van Vuuren and Van Leuvensteijn [2007] show that in the model of Munch
et al. [2006] the hazard rate out of unemployment should be always lower
for homeowners, but in a special case, that is when homeowners can receive
1See Oswald [1996], Oswald [1997] and Oswald [1999].
2Other interpretations explored in the literature refer to the effect of homeownership on
the probability to be employed and on the employed’s probability to become unemployed.
3See Van den Berg and Van Vuuren [1998], Henley [1998], Munch et al. [2006], Van
Vuuren and Van Leuvensteijn [2007] and Battu et al. [2008].
4See Goss and Phillips [1997], Coulson and Fisher [January, 2002], Flatau et al. [2003],
Munch et al. [2006], Van Vuuren and Van Leuvensteijn [2007] and Battu et al. [2008].
5See Rouwendal and Nijkamp [2008], and Havet and Penot [2010] for a survey of this
literature.
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unemployment benefit only for a fixed period, while renters never run out of
it. Even in this case, the theoretical effect of homeownership is ambiguous.
The second explanation takes into account some controversies with the
original Oswald’s definitions of residential status. At first, when compar-
ing homeowners and renters one should account for the role of mortgage
payments in confounding the relation between mobility costs and job search
behaviour. Committed housing expenditures such as the mortgage and the
rent should increase exit rates from unemployment through higher pressure
to return to work. Given that outright owners do not cope with these ex-
penses and that rent payments should be on average lower than mortgage
payments, this interpretation is consistent with the observed unemployment
duration for mortgage-holders being typically the lowest among different res-
idential statuses6. Second, also social and private renters do not behave the
same way7. Social renters may have lower mobility due to lock-in effects sim-
ilar to those which hamper homeowners mobility8. For example, long waiting
lists, security of tenure and the restricted transferability within social hous-
ing may cause social renters to be less prone to move for job reasons than
private renters9. Moreover, also the housing costs effect differs by tenant
status since social renters pay below-market rent.
Our contribution consists in refining the empirical analysis by taking into
account simultaneously housing costs and the distinctions among all the rele-
vant residential statuses, with the purpose of bringing out the empirical effect
of the main mechanism underlying the Oswald’s hypothesis10. We start by
building a theoretical framework with endogenous search which models the
Oswald’s effect as in Munch et al. [2006]. Homeownership rises the reserva-
tion wage and reduces the optimal search in the non local labour market, but
has opposite effects locally. In line with the findings of Van Vuuren and Van
Leuvensteijn [2007], our model overcomes the theoretical ambiguity of the
model of Munch et al. [2006] in that the negative effect of homeownership
on non local outcomes turns out to be unambiguously stronger. In particu-
6Rouwendal and Nijkamp [2008] and Arzilli and Morescalchi [2011] provide evidence
for mortgagers having higher housing costs than renters on average.
7Social housing is a form of housing tenure in which the property is owned by Local
Authorities or by Housing Associations, usually with the aim of providing accommodation
at below-market rent or even rent-free.
8See Flatau et al. [2003], Battu et al. [2008], McCormick [1983], Hughes and McCormick
[1981] and Hughes and McCormick [1987].
9Hughes and McCormick [2000] in a later work argue that these effects may have
lessened.
10Munch et al. [2006], Van Vuuren and Van Leuvensteijn [2007] and Battu et al. [2008],
which represent the most updated analysis of the Oswald’s hypothesis have disregarded
one or both of these issues.
3
lar, the endogenisation of search allows us to evaluate the marginal impacts
of homeownership on both local and non local optimal search and then to
compare them. As a net effect, homeownership reduces the optimal search
and the job finding rate, which means that the Oswald’s hypothesis is still
verified.
In the theoretical model we ignore the role of housing costs but we are
aware that the effect of housing costs may revert the Oswald’s outcome empir-
ically. Hence, the comparison in the model is intended to be between owners
with no mortgage payments and private renters. We do allow for housing
costs in the empirical analysis, where observed outcomes are confounded by
this effect.
We carry out our empirical analysis using data from the British House-
hold Panel Survey (BHPS), which provides job search effort’s measures for
unemployed. We use these categorical measures as dependent variables and
we regress them on the housing tenure dummies using a random effects pro-
bit and controlling for several individual (or household) characteristics. The
BHPS provide us with a measure for housing costs, which we plug in the
regression in order to purge search differentials of the housing costs effect.
Moreover, we control for different tenure statuses among homeowners, be-
tween mortgage and outright, and among renters, between social and private.
Our focus is on the job search intensity, unlike the empirical literature,
which typically has tested the Oswald’s hypothesis looking at the hazard rate.
The probability that an unemployed worker will find a job can be decomposed
as the product of two probabilities: the probability of receiving a job offer
and the probability of this offer being accepted. Job search effort is positively
related to the first, and to the second through the negative relation with the
reservation wage and maybe also through the positive effect of search on
the quality of job offers. Whatsoever, the relationship between search and
the hazard rate is always positive, so nothing is lost whenever we state the
Oswald’s hypothesis in terms of a negative effect of homeownership on the
search intensity.
The empirical evidence we provide is consistent with the theory outlined.
In fact, the Oswald’s hypothesis is confirmed in the sense that the search
differential between outright owners and private renters, the two extremes of
mobility, is negative, even whenever the housing costs effect is netted out.
More in details, though search intensity is usually higher for homeowners
than renters, this difference is no more meaningful when we refine the resi-
dential status definitions, since it is clear that mortgagers search more than
outright owners and private renters more than social. Anyway, the negative
search differential between outright owners and private renters manifests it-
self through the owners’ lower attachment to the labour market, while no
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statistical difference in search intensity measures is found looking only at
non-employed workers who state to have been looking for work in the last
four weeks. Moreover, housing costs work in the expected direction albeit
with weak impact, and never revert the sign of search differentials.
Our findings are very similar to those of Flatau et al. [2003] who, exam-
ining data for Australia, provide strong evidence that the counter-Oswald
results are due to the behaviour of leveraged owners and social tenants. In
fact, while they find that homeowners have higher probability to exit un-
employment than renters, when they compare outright owners with private
renters they find strong evidence, particularly for females, that outright own-
ers are slower to become reemployed than private renters.
2 The Theoretical Model
In this section we present a simplified model of job search with endogenous
search effort and exogenous wage offer distribution11. In order to investi-
gate the Oswald’s explanation for the impact of homeownership on search
behaviour, we ignore housing costs and we just focus on moving costs12.
The effect of homeownership is captured by allowing for two labour mar-
kets which differ geographically as in Munch et al. [2006]. By definition, the
local labour market is the region in which a worker can take a job without
moving. The non local labour market is the rest of the economy. Workers
can have a job only in the region they live in, so if they want to accept a
job offer in the other region they have necessarily to move, i.e. we do not
allow commuting. This setup captures the idea that there exist two distinct
reservation wages, one for the local labour market and one for jobs outside,
which will diverge when moving entails a cost.
To model the lifetime utility of the employed as simple as possible without
affecting our main results, we rule out on-the-job search and we set to zero
the separation rate, that is:
V E(w) =
w
ρ
, (1)
where w is the wage and ρ is the discount rate.
The unemployed can increase the job offer arrival rate through search
activity at the cost of an utility loss of Cs. This cost and the job offers
11See Mortensen [1986] for the background of search modeling and Manning [2009] for
a similar version.
12See ? for an endogenous search model which includes also the housing costs effect.
When comparing search outcomes of homeowners (outright owners) and renters in this set-
up, housing costs simply reinforces the negative effect of homeownership due to moving
costs.
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arrival rate differ between the local and non local labour market uniquely for
the search effort exerted in each of them, which we call sl and sn respectively.
We assume that the total cost of search function is additive in the costs of
search in the two labour markets, i.e. Cs = c(sl) + c(sn), where c′ > 0 and
c′′ > 013. The arrival rate of job offers in the local and non local labour
markets are respectively α(sl) and α(sn), where α′ > 0 and α′′ < 0. Wage
offers are sampled from the c.d.f. F (w) which we assume identical for both
markets. When choosing how to distribute search effort in the two labour
markets, the unemployed must take into account the cost of moving, that is
the cost he would incur if he found and accepted a job in the other region.
The difference in this cost for homeowners and renters is precisely what
captures the Oswald’s effect in the model. For simplicity, we set this cost
to zero for renters since we need only that it is higher for homeowners. The
value equation for the unemployed renter is:
ρV U = b− c(sl)− c(sn) + (α(sl) + α(sn))
∫
w∗r
(V E(w)− V U) dF (w), (2)
where w∗r is the reservation wage for the renter and b is the unemployment
benefit. The unemployed sets the reservation wage and the search effort levels
in order to maximise his lifetime utility. As the renter can move without
costs, he is indifferent between accepting a job in the local labour market or
outside, so the reservation wage is the same in both. Given risk neutrality,
the reservation wage will be such that w∗r = ρV
U . Replacing this and equation
(1) in (2), and rearranging we have:
w∗r = b− c(sl)− c(sn) +
(α(sl) + α(sn))
ρ
∫
w∗r
(w − w∗r) dF (w). (3)
Differentiating (3) with respect to sl and sn we get the first order conditions
for the maximum:
c′(s∗l ) = α
′(s∗l )A, (4)
c′(s∗n) = α
′(s∗n)A, (5)
where we set A = ρ−1
∫
w∗r
(w−w∗r) dF (w). It is easy to show that the unemployed
renter will exert the same search effort in both markets. In fact, from (4)
and (5) we get c′(s∗l )/α
′(s∗l ) = c
′(s∗n)/α
′(s∗n), which is true only when s
∗
l = s
∗
n
14.
13The assumptions on c yield a standard convex total cost of search function. The model
may be enriched by allowing higher costs of search in the non local labour market, but this
is irrelevant for the comparison between search behaviours of homeowners and renters.
14Alternatively, since sl and sn have the same impact on the cost and the revenue for
the unemployed renter, we may maximise with respect to the total search effort s subject
to the constraint s = sl + sn.
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In this simple setup, with no additional costs of search far from home and
no costs of moving, the renter is indifferent between search locally and in a
distant area.
If the unemployed is homeowner he has to consider the cost m which he
would run into if he accepted a job in the non local labour market15. The
discounted lifetime utility for the unemployed homeowner is:
ρV˜ U = b−c(sl)−c(sn)+α(sl)
∫
w∗
l
(
w
ρ
− V˜ U
)
dF (w)+α(sn)
∫
w∗n
(
w
ρ
− V˜ U −m
)
dF (w),
(6)
where we have already replaced V E(w) = w/ρ. Now, we have two distinct levels
of the reservation wage, one for each of the two markets. The reservation wage
for the local labour market is w∗l = ρV˜
U , while the reservation wage for the job
offers outside the local labour market is w∗n = ρV˜
U + ρm: to accept a job offer
which requires a move, the unemployed homeowner needs a compensation
for the cost of moving. Equation (6) can be rewritten as
w∗l = b−c(sl)−c(sn)+
α(sl)
ρ
∫
w∗
l
(w − w∗l ) dF (w)+
α(sn)
ρ
∫
w∗n
(w − w∗l − ρm) dF (w). (7)
The optimal search levels in the two markets are determined by the following
first order conditions:
c′(s∗l ) = α
′(s∗l )B, (8)
c′(s∗n) = α
′(s∗n)C, (9)
where we set B = ρ−1
∫
w∗
l
(w − w∗l ) dF (w) and C = ρ−1
∫
w∗n
(w − w∗n) dF (w). Since
w∗l < w
∗
n, B > C holds for any w. From (7) and (8), B > C implies c
′(s∗l )/α
′(s∗l ) >
c′(s∗n)/α
′(s∗n). Given that c is convex and α is concave, the latter inequality
implies s∗l > s
∗
n. Unlike the renter, for the homeowner is optimal to search
harder in the local labour market than outside.
Up to this point we have found that the renter chooses the same level of
optimal search in both markets, which we indicate as s∗r, while the homeowner
sets s∗l > s
∗
n. To identify the effect of housing tenure we compare now the
search effort of the renter and the homeowner in both markets. A first result
is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 s∗l > s
∗
r > s
∗
n.
15The cost of moving will be the same whether the homeowner moves to another owner-
occupied housing or to a rental accommodation, hence, this model captures only the lower
mobility due to the cost of selling a home. We may enrich the model by differentiating
between moves to a rental and to an owner-occupied accommodation (with higher costs
for the latter), but this higher complexity will not come with any benefits for our purposes.
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Proof :
(a) s∗l > s
∗
r. To prove this we calculate the derivative of s
∗
l with respect to
m by means of the implicit function theorem. At first, we need to calculate
dw∗l /dsl and dw
∗
l /dm and evaluate these functions at the optimum.
Differentiating equation (7) with respect to w∗l and sl we obtain:
dw∗l
dsl
=
ρ−1α′(sl)
∫
w∗
l
(w − w∗l )F ′(w)dw − c′(sl)
1 + ρ−1α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )] + ρ−1α(sn)[1− F (w∗n)]
. (10)
It can be easily shown that this derivative is zero for sl = s∗l , since the numer-
ator is zero as follows directly from the first order condition for s∗l . Moreover
dw∗l /dsl > (<)0 if sl < (>)s
∗
l . Differentiating equation (7) with respect to w
∗
l
and m we obtain:
dw∗l
dm
= − α(sn)[1− F (w
∗
l + ρm)]
1 + ρ−1α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )] + ρ−1α(sn)[1− F (w∗n)]
< 0. (11)
This derivative is negative for any value of sl. Intuitively, as the moving
cost increases, the reservation wage in the local labour market for the home-
owner drops since the acceptation of a job far from home comes with a lower
expected surplus. We rewrite now the first order condition for s∗l as
Φ(s∗l ,m) = c
′(s∗l )−
α′(s∗l )
ρ
∫
w∗
l
(s∗
l
,m)
[w − w∗l (s∗l ,m)]F ′(w)dw = 0. (12)
Applying the implicit function theorem we have16
ds∗l
dm
= −Φm
Φs∗
l
= −
ρ−1α′(s∗l )
∫
w∗
l
(
dw∗l
dm
)
F ′(w)dw
c′′(s∗l )− ρ−1α′′(s∗l )
∫
w∗
l
(w − w∗l )F ′(w)dw
> 0. (13)
As expected, the higher is the moving cost, the higher is the search of the
homeowner in the local labour market. Since the relation between s∗l and
m is positive for any value of m, this will be true in particular when m = 0,
that is when the optimal search locally (and non locally) is s∗r = s
∗
l . Thus,
16When computing Φs∗l we remark that
Φs∗l = c
′′(s∗l )−
α′′(s∗l )
ρ
∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l )F ′(w)dw +
α′(s∗l )
ρ
∫
w∗l
(
dw∗l
dsl
)
F ′(w)dw =
= c′′(s∗l )−
α′′(s∗l )
ρ
∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l )F ′(w)dw > 0,
where the simplification is allowed given that dw∗l /dsl = 0 when sl = s
∗
l . This derivative
is clearly positive since c′′ > 0, α′′ < 0, F ′ > 0. Also, Φm is negative since α′ > 0, F ′ > 0
and dw∗l /dm < 0.
8
when m increases from zero to a positive number, which captures a shift
from tenant to owner status, the unemployed will increase search in the local
labour market from s∗r to s
∗
l .
(b) s∗n < s
∗
r. As in the previous case we calculate the derivatives dw
∗
n/dsn
and dw∗n/dm and we study the sign of ds
∗
n/dm. Differentiating the equation
w∗n = w
∗
l + ρm with respect to w
∗
n and sn we obtain:
dw∗n
dsn
=
ρ−1α′(sn)
∫
w∗n
(w − w∗n)F ′(w)dw − c′(sn)
1 + ρ−1α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )] + ρ−1α(sn)[1− F (w∗n)]
. (14)
Given the first order condition for s∗n, this derivative is zero when sn = s
∗
n.
Moreover dw∗n/dsn > (<)0 if sn < (>)s
∗
n. Differentiating with respect to w
∗
n and
m we obtain:
dw∗n
dm
=
ρ+ α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )]
1 + ρ−1α(sl)[1− F (w∗l )] + ρ−1α(sn)[1− F (w∗n)]
> 0. (15)
This derivative is positive for any value of sn. A rise in the moving cost
requires a higher wage to induce the homeowner to move for a job. We
rewrite the first order condition for s∗n as
Ψ(s∗n,m) = c
′(s∗n)−
α′(s∗n)
ρ
∫
w∗n(s∗n,m)
[w − w∗n(s∗n,m)]F ′(w)dw = 0. (16)
Applying the implicit function theorem we have17
ds∗n
dm
= −Ψm
Ψs∗n
= −
ρ−1α′(s∗n)
∫
w∗n
(
dw∗n
dm
)
F ′(w)dw
c′′(s∗n)− ρ−1α′′(s∗n)
∫
w∗n
(w − w∗n)F ′(w)dw
< 0. (17)
The relation between s∗n and m is negative for any value of m, thus, when m
increases from zero to a positive number the unemployed will reduce search
in the non local labour market from s∗r to s
∗
n.
The rationale of this proposition is straightforward. When the unem-
ployed has to face a cost of moving to accept a job offer far from home,
he search less outside and centres his effort on the local area to reduce the
probability of incurring this cost18. Whether or not the homeowner search
in general less than the renter depends on the balance of these two oppo-
site effects, whose net result can be identified within this framework, unlike
17In the computation of Ψs∗n we make use of the fact that dw
∗
n/dsn = 0 when sn = s
∗
n.
The sign of Ψm is positive since dw
∗
n/dm > 0.
18Commuting would be another mechanism which implies that homeowners may search
locally more than renters. Given the higher costs of moving, homeowners would be willing
to commute longer so that their local labour market would be larger. Anyway, no major
changes would take place for our purposes if we allowed for commuting in this set-up.
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in Munch et al. [2006]. Before to tackle this point, we show the relations
between the reservation wages of homeowners and renters in both markets,
which is the counterpart of proposition 1. That is stated in the following
proposition19:
Proposition 2 w∗l < w
∗
r < w
∗
n.
Proof : We only need to look at the first order conditions (4), (5), (8), (9)
and to remark the result of Proposition 1 and that c′(·)/α′(·) is an increasing
function.
w∗l < w
∗
r ←→ B > A←→
c′(s∗l )
α′(s∗l )
>
c′(s∗r)
α′(s∗r)
←→ s∗l > s∗r ,
w∗n > w
∗
r ←→ C < A←→
c′(s∗n)
α′(s∗n)
<
c′(s∗r)
α′(s∗r)
←→ s∗n < s∗r .
In order to compare the total search level of the homeowner and the
renter, that is the impact of housing tenure on search, we just have to com-
pare the sum of search levels in the local and in the non local market for
both. The search level of the homeowner will be higher, equal or lower than
that of the renter as far as s∗l + s
∗
n R 2s∗r. The only thing which differentiates
the homeowner from the renter is the moving cost, so we may expect that an
increase of the moving cost from zero to a positive number, which represents
just a shift from renter to owner tenure, comes with a reduction of the total
search. The rationale is that, although this cost is incurred only if the home-
owner actually moves, it increases the expected cost of search, which in turn
makes unemployment more valuable. Thus, despite the incentive to search
harder locally, this expected cost has to be covered by an extra reduction in
the non local search (from s∗r to s
∗
n) with respect to what would be needed
to compensate the increase in the local search (from s∗r to s
∗
l ). The following
proposition supports this insight:
Proposition 3 2s∗r > s
∗
l + s
∗
n.
Proof : Since we cannot derive a closed form for the optimal search levels,
the device of the demonstration is to study the derivatives of s∗l and s
∗
n with
regards to m evaluated at m = 0. In fact, when m = 0 the optimal search is
identical in both the local and non local markets, so by deriving the optimal
search levels with respect to m we can compare the magnitude of the (op-
posite) marginal variations, which can be interpreted simply as “marginal”
19This result is the same of what Munch et al. [2006] obtain in a model of search very
similar to ours except that they do not endogenise search effort.
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differences in each market’s search levels between homeowner and renter.
Then we just need to show that the magnitude of the marginal decrease in
the non local search is higher, in absolute terms, than the marginal increase
in the local search. Let’s look at equations (13) and (17) which represent
the marginal variations of the homeowner’s local and non local search re-
spectively. When m = 0, we have s∗l = s
∗
r = s
∗
n thus the two derivatives are
identical expect for the derivatives of the reservation wage in the numerator,
which have opposite sign:
ds∗l
dm
(m = 0) = −
ρ−1α′(s∗r)
∫
w∗r
(
dw∗l
dm
(m = 0)
)
F ′(w)dw
c′′(s∗r)− ρ−1α′′(s∗r)
∫
w∗r
(w − w∗r)F ′(w)dw
, (18)
ds∗n
dm
(m = 0) = −
ρ−1α′(s∗r)
∫
w∗r
(
dw∗n
dm
(m = 0)
)
F ′(w)dw
c′′(s∗r)− ρ−1α′′(s∗r)
∫
w∗r
(w − w∗r)F ′(w)dw
. (19)
Making use of equations (11) and (15) we can evaluate the derivatives of the
reservation wages at the optimal values of search when m = 0:
dw∗l
dm
(s∗r ,m = 0) = −
α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r ]
1 + ρ−1α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)] + ρ−1α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)]
, (20)
dw∗n
dm
(s∗r ,m = 0) =
ρ+ α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)]
1 + ρ−1α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)] + ρ−1α(s∗r)[1− F (w∗r)]
. (21)
It is easy to show that ρ > 0 implies dw
∗
n
dm
(s∗r ,m = 0) > | dw
∗
l
dm
(s∗r ,m = 0)|, which
in turn implies | ds∗n
dm
(m = 0)| > ds∗l
dm
(m = 0). This means that, for small m, the
difference in the non local search between homeowner and renter is higher, in
absolute value, than the difference in the local search, that is s∗r − s∗n > s∗l − s∗r,
which rearranging is identical to the proposition. This holds for every m so
the proposition is proved.
Unlike the model of Munch et al. [2006], but like Van Vuuren and Van
Leuvensteijn [2007], we can make clear predictions also on the whole job find-
ing rates of the homeowner and the renter20. The renter’s job finding rate is
two times hr = α(s∗r) [1− F (w∗r)], which is the common job finding rate for both
20Van Vuuren and Van Leuvensteijn [2007] show that in the model of Munch et al.
[2006] the hazard rate to exit unemployment for homeowners is unambiguously lower than
that for renters. Anyway, in the generalized version of the model Van Vuuren and Van
Leuvensteijn [2007] allow for differences in the unemployment benefit duration between
homeowners and renters which brings non-stationarity into the model of Munch et al.
[2006]. In particular they assume that homeowners receive benefits for only T periods
of unemployment, while renters receive benefits for the whole unemployment spell. This
implies a reduction in the relative reservation wages of homeowners from T onwards. As a
consequence, though homeowners have higher exit rates from unemployment than renters
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markets, while the owner’s job finding rate is the sum of hl = α(s∗l ) [1− F (w∗l )]
and hn = α(s∗n) [1− F (w∗n)], which refer respectively to the local and to the
non local market. In order to compare job finding rates, we first point out
that, given Propositions 1 and 2, hl > hr > hn. Thus, unemployed living in
owner-occupied accommodation are expected to have a higher exit rate from
unemployment towards jobs which require a move, but a lower exit rate to-
wards employment in the local labour market. The main mechanism of the
Oswald’s hypothesis works in this setup, since homeownership reduces the
chances to find an acceptable job far from home by hampering residential
mobility. Can we also state that renters have a higher exit rates than home-
owners in general? This is the case if 2hr > hl+hn, which again can be showed
to be true within this framework. The logic of the demonstration is similar
to that of Proposition 3 and relies on its results.
Proposition 4 2α(s∗r) [1− F (w∗r)] > α(s∗l ) [1− F (w∗l )] + α(s∗n) [1− F (w∗n)].
Proof : We just need to prove the negative sign of the derivative of (hl + hn)
with respect to m at the optimal values of search when m = 0. Defining
dw∗l
dm
(s∗r ,m = 0) = L
w, dw
∗
n
dm
(s∗r ,m = 0) = N
w, ds
∗
l
dm
(m = 0) = Ls and ds
∗
n
dm
(m = 0) = N s,
we have:
d(hl + hn)
dm
(s∗r ,m = 0) = α
′(s∗r) [1− F (w∗r)]Ls − α(s∗r)F ′(w∗r)Lw+
+ α′(s∗r) [1− F (w∗r)]N s − α(s∗r)F ′(w∗r)Nw =
= α′(s∗r) [1− F (w∗r)] (Ls +N s)− α(s∗r)F ′(w∗r)(Lw +Nw) < 0,
(22)
where the latter inequality holds since (Ls +N s) < 0 and (Lw +Nw) > 0, which
are results of Proposition 3.
To conclude, the theoretical section delivers us a clear message: mobility
costs imply lower search and exit rates from unemployment for homeowners,
thus the local versus non local search explanation is not able alone to revert
the argument underlying the Oswald effect. In the empirical section we will
provide some evidence for this by abstracting from the role of housing costs.
in the local labour market, the reverse is no more necessarily the case in the non local
labour market. Thus, as long as the benefit exhaustion assumption holds, the model of
Van Vuuren and Van Leuvensteijn [2007] yields ambiguous results as in Munch et al.
[2006] pointing out the need for empirical research. But whit no unemployment benefit
exhaustion, as in the stationary framework of Munch et al. [2006] and in the ours, this
indeterminacy is eliminated.
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3 Methodology and Data
We draw our data set from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
a nationally representative annual panel survey which has been carried out
continuously since 1991. A random sample of around 5,500 households, ac-
counting for around 10,000 adult members, was drawn at the start of the
survey, then all residents of those households were traced and re-interviewed
each year up to now. Each wave there are flows in and out of the survey, so
the panel is highly unbalanced21. At time of writing the last wave released
refers to 2007, so we have 17 waves at our disposal.
The BHPS contains detailed information about the economic activity
status of an individual. We focus on the group of non-employed, that is
people who state not to have a job, and among these we distinguish between
unemployed and people out of the labour force, the first being essentially
job seekers and the second non-job seekers. Our definition of unemployment
is similar but not identical to the standard ILO definition. We classify as
unemployed those without a job who have been looking for work in the last
four weeks, which is one of the two ILO’s requirements, but, unlike the
second, we do not drop out of the pool people who are not available to start
a new job within the following two weeks22. The BHPS provides two different
measures of job search intensity for unemployed. On the one hand, they are
asked whether they searched for work in the last week or in the last four. On
the other hand, they are asked which search methods they used so we can
derive the total number of methods (from 0 to 5). We use these categorical
measures as dependent variables and we regress them on the housing tenure
dummies controlling for several individual (or household) characteristics23.
Since our dependent variables are categorical, either binary or ordinal,
we run non linear panel regressions, using in particular a random effects pro-
bit model24. Unfortunately it is very problematic to perform a fixed effects
21If a member of the original sample drops off the original household, all adult members
of his new households will also be interviewed. Moreover, the original sample has been
supplemented with a number of “boost” groups, including major additional subsamples
from Wales and Scotland (1999 onwards), and Northern Ireland (2001 onwards). Many
people out of the original sample and out of those who are subsequently added, may drop
off the survey due to various reasons such as move abroad, death, co-residents of original
sample members who no longer live with a sample member and so on.
22The problem is that the related question is asked only since wave 6.
23See Wadsworth [1991] for a reduced form estimation of search intensity measures
on data drawn from the UK Labour Force Survey. He used as dependent variable the
number of search methods too, but in a simpler econometric set-up. See also Schmitt and
Wadsworth [1993] and Gregg and Wadsworth [1996]
24The motivation for using non linear rather than linear models for categorical dependent
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analysis for non linear models such as probit or logit. This is due to the so
called “incidental parameters problem” which prevents to consistently esti-
mate the parameters of the index function along with the individual effects
when the number of cross sections is small25. While a solution to get consis-
tent estimates for fixed effects logit models has been found (see for example
Chamberlain [1980]), this is not the case for the fixed effects probit. The
usual device is to find a sufficient statistic for the unobserved effects which
allows these to be conditioned out of the likelihood function. Such a sufficient
statistic does not exist for the fixed effects probit. An unconditional fixed
effects probit maybe estimated just plugging in a large number of individual
dummies, but estimates would be biased26.
Though fixed-T-consistent estimators have been derived for panel logit
models, these methods have some drawbacks. In particular, given the way the
sufficient statistic is build, only observations for individuals who switch status
between two subsequent periods can be kept in the computation. Then they
do not provide estimates for individual effects, thus precluding estimation
of other quantities of interest such as marginal effects. Also, unlike the
probit approach, these fixed effects logit models require a conditional serial
independence assumption for consistency, which may be even less appealing
when several time periods are available (see Wooldridge [2010], pag. 492).
In the end, the random effects probit turned out to be the most reliable
technique we have come up with, although of course it puts restrictions on
the relation between the regressors and the unobserved effects. The choice of
a panel rather than a pooled analysis is motivated by the better properties of
the random effects model in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which
is always detected by the likelihood ratio test of ρ in our regressions.
variables is typically that in the linear model the predicted probabilities are not guaranteed
to lie in the unit interval. Moreover, in a panel setting the linear model would also require
an unnatural assumption on the unobserved heterogeneity (see Wooldridge [2010]).
25See Wooldridge [2010] and Baltagi [2008] for an exhaustive treatment of estimation
techniques and problems in applying panel models with a discrete dependent variable.
26See Ferna´ndes-Val [2009] for a discussion of the magnitude of the fixed effects probit’s
bias. He argues that the magnitude of the bias of the marginal effects’ estimates may be
small for a range of distributions of regressors and individual effects, even for small T.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Unemployed Sample
In our sample we can observe search measures only for unemployed, that
is for those who searched for work in the last four weeks27. At first, we
report estimates of random effects probit models for both of search measures
within the unemployed sample. Then we discuss the sample selection bias
issue which arises when inactive people, for whom search intensity is zero by
definition, are excluded from the sample. In fact we can think of inactive
people as workers who have chosen a degree of search intensity equal to
zero due to the same set of variables which affect the search intensity of
unemployed, at least after controlling for other characteristics which may be
crucial in determining the choice of being out of the labour force, such as
full-time education, retirement or disability. The final specification will thus
include also inactive and the fairly larger sample will allow us to get more
precise results28.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 report estimates for the unemployed sample. The de-
pendent variable used in Table 1 is a dummy which takes 1 if the unemployed
searched in the last week and 0 if searched in the last 4 weeks but not in the
last. Tables 2 and 3 report estimates which focus on the number of search
methods, the former using an ordinal variable (from 0 to 5 methods), the
latter grouping these numbers in a dummy which takes 1 for high numbers
(3, 4 and 5 methods), and takes 0 for low numbers (0, 1 and 2 methods).
The first two columns of each table refer to models which include the dummy
owner for housing tenure, which pools both outright owners and mortgagers,
while in models (3) and (4) we use two housing tenure dummies, mortgager
and outright owner, in order to distinguish between these two categories:
the coefficient of each of these dummies captures the difference in search be-
tween the category which names the dummy and the reference category, i.e.
renters. In models (1) and (3) there is no control for housing costs, while in
models (2) and (4) we add the housing costs variable in order to check how
it affects the coefficients of the housing tenure dummies.
Table 1 shows that owners as a whole have a higher probability than
renters to search in the last week. Anyway, in models which distinguish
between the two owners categories we see that this difference is driven by
the higher probability of mortgagers, while there is no significant difference
between outright owners and renters. Housing costs have a positive impact
27We restrict the sample to people in working age, i.e. males in age range 16-64 and
females in age range 16-59.
28See the appendix for a description of the variables selected.
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on search as expected, but the effect is not significant when we allow for the
mortgager dummy (see column 4). Moreover, when we add the housing costs
variable to model (3), the coefficient of mortgager slightly drops while the
coefficient of outright owner slightly increases. These results are even more
evident when we look at search methods. Table 2 gives perhaps more precise
results since it exploits all the variation in the number of search methods.
In fact owner and mortgager dummies are highly significant confirming that
the difference in search between owners and non owners is explained only by
the higher search of mortgagers. Housing costs are again significant in model
(2) but not in model (4).
Unfortunately, since coefficients reported in Table 2 are just the coeffi-
cients of the probit’s index function, they do not have a straight meaning
in terms of magnitude, although they give information on the direction and
on the statistical importance of the effect. For ordered probit models like
this one might report the marginal effects on the probability of being in each
of 6 statuses but it would be confusing, so we prefer to look at Table 3 to
have an idea of the magnitude of the effects. In column (4) of Table 3 we
see that the probability of using a large number of methods for mortgagers
is around 10 percentage points higher than renters, which is very close to
the effect we get when we use the last-week/last-4-weeks variable in Table 1.
Moreover, a 1% rise in housing costs increases this probability by 4 points,
while the effect in Table 1 is 2.5 points (for money variables such as housing
costs and equivalized income we always report semi-elasticities)29. There are
also several significant and interesting effects from other variables which we
prefer to discuss later when we deal with a larger sample.
4.2 Whole Sample
The analysis so far focuses on the unemployed sample, but we argue that es-
timates are biased unless we allow also for inactive people. Search behaviour
does not concern only the choice of the degree of search, but also the choice
of searching or not in the first place. For some individuals the outcome of the
set of variables we have allowed for may be no search in the last four weeks,
which means that these drop out of the unemployed sample. This is a clear
example of non-random sample selection, which results in biasing estimates
on the sub-sample. In order to account for individuals who self-select in in-
activity we replicate the same analysis as above for the overall sample, that
is unemployed plus inactive.
29For model (4), the housing costs variable is significant only in Table 3, though mildly,
while in Table 1 and 2 it is very close to significance.
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Anyway, this strategy must be tackled carefully since the choice of being
inactive depends also on other reasons than those which influence the search
optimization process, such as housing tenure for example. In fact, for in-
dividuals in working age who are simply not interested in work, the choice
between unemployment and inactivity cannot be interpreted as a matter of
choice about the intensity of search. In order to distinguish within the inac-
tive sample between these individuals and those who would be interested in
working but have set their search level to zero, we use controls for retirement,
full-time education and incapability to work, which should account for most
of the reasons for individuals not being involved in a search choice process.
Table 4 reports estimates of the baseline models when we use the larger
sample of unemployed plus inactive and the dependent variable is a dummy
for the status. Since these models include also the three controls, coefficients
of the other variables should actually capture the effect on the search choice
for individuals who are actually involved in the search choice process. As ex-
pected, all of these controls are highly significant and have a very strong im-
pact. Interestingly, outright owners are far less likely to search than renters,
while typically there are not significant differences in search intensity when
unemployed as shown before. Thus the mobility effect of homeownership
seems to work by reducing the attachment to the labour market of outright
owners rather than by reducing their search intensity relative to renters.
One alternative strategy to allow for purely inactive individuals, may be
to drop people who are in full-time education, who get retirement pension or
get disability benefits. Anyway this strategy does not seem very promising
since the percentage of people in each of these statuses who are actually
inactive is not as high as one may expect. As Table 5 shows, more than
a half of people in full-time education or getting a retirement pension can
be job seekers or even employed, while for people on disability benefits this
is the case for at least 15%. Since a non negligible portion of these people
seem to be able to look for work or even to have a job, it is reasonable
that their search behaviour may be influenced by also other reasons than
being in that status, which arguably are the same which affect the degree of
search intensity of job seekers, such as housing tenure. We thus include in
the sample all inactive people setting their search effort equal to zero30.
Tables 6, 7 and 8 report results when we pool unemployed and inactive.
In models of Table 6 we just add the inactive category to the two used in
the dependent variable of Table 1: the dependent variable has now three
30People who have not searched in the last four weeks may have searched, for example,
5 or 6 weeks before, but since we cannot observe these measures we set search to zero for
all of them.
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categories so an ordered probit is required for estimation. Table 7 and 8
correspond to Table 2 and Table 3 respectively, except that in the 0 methods
group we include also inactive people.
These three Tables conceive the same information on the differences in
search activity by housing tenure, confirming part of the results found within
the unemployed sample. The difference in search between homeowners as a
whole and renters is positive and not strongly significant, but this is clearly
the result of the balancing of two opposite effects as the models in column
(3) and (4) highlight: on the one side, mortgagers search more than renters,
but on the other side, outright owners search less. In fact, the coefficient of
outright owner is negative and strongly significant in Table 6 and 731, which
is in line with results of Table 4 but at odds with results drawn from the
unemployed sample. Thus it appears that among unemployed there is not a
relevant difference in search intensity between outright owners and renters,
but once we allow for the effect of housing tenure on the choice to search, the
difference gets negative and significant. To have an idea of the magnitude
of the effect, in column (4) of Table 8 is shown that outright owners are less
likely than renters by 10 percentage points to use a high number of search
methods.
Are these differences in search intensity driven by mobility or by housing
costs? Something can be said by analysing the housing costs variable. Its
coefficient is always positive and significant, which means that the higher
the housing costs the higher the pressure to find a job thus the higher the
search intensity. In particular, a 1% increase in housing costs implies 3.3
points more in the probability of using a high number of search methods
(see Table 8, model 4). Typically, the housing costs effect decreases and is
fairly less significant when we split the owner dummy in two dummies32. In
fact, when mortgagers and outright owners are pooled as in model (2), the
variation in search due to the difference in their individual characteristics is
left unexplained, and this effect is captured by the housing costs variable.
Moreover, when we add the housing costs variable in the model with two
housing tenure dummies, the coefficient of mortgager drops while that of
31In model (4) of Table 8 this coefficient is significant only at a 10% level, but here the
effect cannot be captured as precisely as when all the variation in the number of search
methods is exploited
32This is clear both in the unemployed sample, as discussed above, and in the non-
employed sample. Reported coefficients In Table 6 and 7 are just those of the index
function, so we cannot state how large is an effect though we can state if the effect of a
variable is larger in a specific model. The coefficient of housing costs is always 0.0 in these
Tables (since we are measuring the effect of an only one pound increase in the variable)
thus the lowering of the size from model (2) to model (4) cannot be identified. Anyway, if
we look at omitted decimals we can state that this is the case for both Tables.
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outright owner increases; clearly, since mortgagers and outright owners have,
respectively, higher and lower housing costs than renters, if we omit the
housing costs variable the coefficient of the former is biased upwards while
the coefficient of the latter is biased downwards, given the positive effect of
housing costs on search. Anyway, the change in these coefficients whenever
we add the control for housing costs is always slight and the signs are never
reverted: this means that housing costs matter but also that much of the
search differentials are still unexplained.
To sum up, it appears that renters search more than outright owners
since they have housing costs to cope with, but whenever we control for this
effect, the differential in search is still high which is probably due to renters’
higher mobility. This negative differential in search between outright owners
and renters is precisely what the Oswald effect calls for. Right here comes
the reconciliation between theory and evidence argued in the title. In fact,
on the one hand, our theoretical model confirms the old idea that the lower
mobility of homeowners implies lower search effort, once we abstract from
the role of housing costs. On the other hand, we observe in the data, even
after controlling for housing costs, higher search measures for renters than
outright owners, for whom the mobility effect is the only one operating, and
even at its maximum.
4.3 Social vs Private Renters
Anyway, given that mobility matters, we would not expect also that mort-
gagers search more than renters whenever we net out the housing costs effect.
One partial explanation for this counterintuitive finding can be sought in the
nature of rent. In fact, when comparing renters to the other categories we
should be aware that renters’ search outcome may be different between social
and private renters, since the former may actually be less prone to move for
job reasons due to lock-in effects similar to those which hamper homeown-
ers’ mobility33. In our whole sample of non-employed, 73% of renters occupy
social housing, thus our analysis so far may be seriously confounded unless
social housing does not hamper mobility. In order to control if the “lock-in”
effect of social housing really matters, we replicate the previous estimations
splitting the renter sample in two distinct groups. In particular, we add a
dummy for social renters to the specification with the housing costs variable
and with dummies for outright owners and mortgagers. The omitted group
33Moreover, social renting comes at below market rent or even rent-free. In our whole
sample of non-employed, 48% of social renters pay zero rent. Anyway this effect on search
differentials should be captured by the housing costs variable.
19
consists of private renters, thus the coefficient of the groups included is to be
interpreted as the search differential with respect to them.
Table 9 reports results for five of the regressions previously discussed:
each regression is identical to that of the correspondent Table except for
the social renter dummy. The first two models use the unemployed sample
and refer to the dummy for search last week or last 4 weeks, and to the
number of search methods variable, respectively (see Table 1 and Table 2
respectively). Again, when unemployed, mortgagers search more than every
other category notwithstanding the control for social housing, while there
are no significant differences among the other categories. But if we look at
regression III, which models the probability of being a job seeker, we notice
that the difference between mortgagers and private renters disappears, while
both social renters and outright owners are less likely to be unemployed than
private renters. These results are confirmed in the subsequent two models
which account also for the different degree of search among unemployed.
Moreover, the hypothesis that the coefficients of the three housing tenure
dummies are identical in pairs are strongly rejected, which means that we
can identify a clear pattern of search effort levels: (1) private renters search
as much as mortgagers; (2) mortgagers and private renters search more than
both social renters and outright owners; (3) social renters search more than
outright owners. Anyway, we remark that this pattern of search behaviour
work through a different degree of attachment to the labour market, while
the results within the unemployed sample are not clear cut.
In conclusion, the distinction between social and private renters can at
least in part explain why the difference in search between mortgagers and
renters as a whole is so high. But it is still unexplained why mortgagers,
who are homeowners, are the category with the highest search measures. In
the first place, we should take into account that the mobility effect for some
mortgagers may be not as strong as that for outright owners (and social
renters). In fact it seems reasonable to believe that outright owners have a
stronger attachment to the accommodation since time spent in the current
accommodation should be longer on average and since they may have higher
transaction costs for moving home. With regards to the housing cost effect,
some possible explanations may be that the housing costs variable of the
BHPS has some measurement errors, or that it cannot capture what increases
the search of mortgagers relative to renters who pay the rent. However, the
most likely explanation is that the pressure to pay the mortgage is far higher
than the pressure to pay the rent and this different pressure may not be
simply captured by treating housing costs in the same way for both.
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4.4 The Effect of the Other Covariates
In order to shed some light on the reliability of our conclusions, we discuss
now the estimated effects of the economic and demographic variables on
search effort. Estimates are consistent with economic interpretation, which
is a valid signal of the goodness of our specification. We refer to results of
Table 9 as models reported here distinguish among all of the housing tenure
categories, and allow for housing costs. In particular we select model V since
the dependent variable is the most precise. Moreover, if we look at model
V in combination with models II and III, we can also understand whether
the impacts work through an influence on labour force participation, on the
intensity of search, or on both.
Variables which increase the reservation wage imply lower search, hence,
as expected, the effect of the household income is negative and the effect of
the variable which captures the perceived individual’s financial situation is
positive, where a higher value means a worse situation. More educated work-
ers search more than less educated or with no qualifications, as education
increases the probability of finding a job and the return from employment.
Females search less than males due to the lower participation to labour mar-
ket, but this effect is clear even within the unemployed sample. Individuals
who live in households within which there is at least one dependent child
search less, but the effect is not significant: in theory, the need to look af-
ter children may affect labour force participation of at least one household
member, who is typically a female (no wonder, this effect is significant in
model III). The fact that this effect should work mainly for females and not
for males, may explain why the coefficient is not significant given that we
include a dummy for gender34.
Search intensity drops as the number of household members rises. In
theory the effect of the household size on search activity should work through
the influence on the household income, but as our measure of household
income is scaled controlling for the number of members, this effect should
no more appear in the household size variable. So this variable is probably
capturing a residual effect not accounted for by the scaling of the household
income or by other variables related to the household size.
The effect of age on search is negative and monotonic, given that prime-
age workers search more than older and less than younger ones. The rationale
is that the return from search is lower the lower the time horizon. However,
while the effect of the elderly dummy is very strong, the difference between
young and prime-age workers is typically smaller (see Table 8), given that
34Wadsworth [1991] found a negative and significant effect on search in the sample of
females, while the effect was not significant in the sample of men.
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workers at the start of their career may experience some inactivity spells35.
The duration effect is very clear: the higher the duration since last job the
lower search effort due to the deterioration of skills and the discouragement
effect36. People who have never had a job search less than those with low
duration, but their coefficient is not as high as that of the last category since
some of them may be young workers about to enter the labour market with
strong motivations.
The dummies which capture the relationship with the head of household
show that children search more than the head of household and his/her part-
ner, and that between the latter there is no difference (see the appendix for
the groupings in these dummies). In theory we should expect that more
responsible members, i.e. those with stronger commitments to the home or
the household, search more, thus it appears strange that children are more
active in the job search. However, this does not imply that the commitment
effect is not operating once we take into account that a not negligible per-
centage of head of households live alone within the household (11% within
the non-employed sample), for whom commitments are definitely lower, and
that the child dummy may be capturing part of the negative effect of age.
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that in the unemployed sample the sign
of the child dummy is negative, which means that the positive coefficients
in the whole sample reflects a higher attachment to the labour market for
children rather than a stricter job search behaviour.
Unemployed benefit claimants search more than non-claimants and the
effect is strongly significant in all models we tested. It can be argued that
claimants are able to keep closer ties with the labour market due to the
financial support (see Wadsworth [1991]). However, there is also a reverse
causality issue: non-employed who search more are more likely to meet the
requirements for the benefit eligibility. This channel is even more important
from 1996, when the UK Jobseeker’s Allowance was introduced37.
To conclude, one concern about the reliability of the estimated difference
in search between renters and outright owners may arise. In the literature
it has been argued that housing tenure may be endogenous since it may be
35These findings are similar to those of Wadsworth [1991]. He found that old workers
search significantly less than their prime-age counterparts, and that young workers search
more if males and less if females, though the latter two effects are not significant.
36These findings partly disagree with those of Wadsworth [1991], who found a hump-
shaped relation in the sense that search effort increases in the initial stages of unemploy-
ment and then drops.
37The Jobseekers’ Allowance involved notable tightenings of search criteria which have
to be met for the unemployment benefit eligibility. See Manning [2009], Petrongolo [2009]
and ?
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correlated with unobservable factors which in turn help determine labour
market outcomes. For example, individuals may self-select housing tenure
on the ground of their intrinsic mobility, as well as of their greater desire
to retain proximity to family members or friends, so that people who are
more mobile may prefer to chose rented accommodations. Moreover, housing
tenure choice may be influenced by unaccounted wealth effects or unobserved
skill gaps which as well increase search intensity. Depending on which are
the most important sources of endogeneity, the true differences in search
between residential statuses may be larger or smaller than what we estimated.
Unfortunately, if one is willing to exploit the panel dimension of data at hand,
there is not a simple way to control for endogeneity in this econometric set-up
given that the fixed effects analysis for discrete response models is not well
developed.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the old argument that homeownership reduces
exit rates from unemployment by hampering residential mobility, which is
known under the name of Oswald’s effect. While the empirical literature on
this point has confirmed that unemployed homeowners are less prone than
renters to move for job reasons, the typical finding is that homeowners have
lower unemployment duration, which is exactly the reverse of the Oswald
hypothesis. By exploring the reasons for these falsifications of the Oswald
hypothesis, we provide a more refined empirical evidence which is consistent
with the underlying theory.
At first, we develop a search theory which is in accordance with the
Oswald effect. In particular this model overcomes an ambiguity which may
arise in models which distinguish between local and non local labour markets.
In these models homeownership reduces the job finding rate in the non local
labour market but it increases the local job finding rate, so that the latter
effect may dominate empirically. By allowing for endogenous search we show
that, as net result, homeownership unambiguously reduces the optimal search
and the job finding rate.
Then, in the empirical analysis we allow for housing costs and for the
different nature of tenure, both among owners and among renters, in order
to point out the true effect of owners’ lower mobility. In particular, within
the homeowners’ group we distinguish between outright owners and owners
who pay the mortgage, and within the renters’ group we distinguish between
social and private. Once the housing costs effect is controlled for, the results
show that, while homeowners search more than renters as found in the earlier
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literature, outright owners alone search less than renters, and the difference is
even higher when we compare them to private renters. This difference works
mainly through a lower attachment to the labour market of outright owners,
while there are not significant differences within the unemployed sample.
Housing costs work in the expected direction, though the effect is not as
strong as expected. Moreover, once we control for housing costs, mortgagers
have a similar search to the supposed more mobile private renters, which
means that the higher level of housing costs cannot explain alone why mort-
gagers search so much. The most likely explanation is that the pressure to
pay the mortgage is far higher than the pressure to pay the rent and this
pressure cannot simply be captured by treating housing costs in the same
way for both.
In brief, we argue that tests of the Oswald hypothesis which compare
homeowners and renters as if they were two distinct groups are misleading,
since some individuals who belong to one of these share common features
with some individuals belonging to the other. If we group individuals in only
two different categories the empirical effect is confounded, but if we allow for
proper distinctions, some evidence in favour of the Oswald hypothesis can be
provided.
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Appendix. Description of Variables
Housing Tenure dummies
Housing tenure related questions refer to the household. Then the
outcome of the household is imputed to all individuals belonging to it
at the date of interview.
owner: selects all individuals whose household owns the accommo-
dation, either outright or with mortgage.
mortgager: accommodation owned with mortgage.
outright owner: accommodation outright owned.
renter: accommodation rented.
social renter: accommodation rented from Local Authorities or Hous-
ing Associations.
private renter: accommodation rented from private.
Housing costs
Measures net monthly mortgage or rent costs as paid in the last month
instalment. For renters who receive housing benefit, either partial or
complete, includes the rent after the rebate. Variable is zero for houses
rent free or owned outright. This is an household variable, so the
housing costs for the household are imputed to all individuals within it
at the date of interview. As all monetary variables, this is adjusted for
inflation using a Retail Prices Index (the czbh series at the ONS web
site).
Equivalized household income
As household income we use the sum of the gross individual incomes
perceived last month. It is a gross variable in that we refer to incomes
before deductions for income tax, NI, pension contributions and local
taxes have been made. For each household income we apply the Mc-
Clements’ scale factor to account for the effects of household size and
composition on needs in making income comparisons. Thus the effect
of our equivalized income measure should not be sensitive either to the
household size or to its composition.
Household size
Number of people living within the household at the time of interview.
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Dependent child
This is a dummy for households with at least one dependent child, that
is those up to 18, if they are still in (non-advanced) full-time education.
Claimant
This is a dummy for people claiming unemployment-related benefit. On
the 7th October 1996 it was introduced the Job Seeker’s Allowance who
replaced the old unemployment benefit system. With JSA unemployed
can claim both cont-JSA, which replaced the old contribution-based
Unemployment Benefit (UB), and inc-JSA, which replaced the old re-
tributive element, i.e. Income Support for unemployed. While after
1996 there is a clear question which asks directly if the respondent is
claiming JSA (whether cont-JSA or inc-JSA), before that it is more
complicated to identify claimants for the retributive element, since the
question on income support benefits is general and does not specify
the reasons for the claim. The strategy is thus to count in the unem-
ployment benefit claimants pool also people who get income support,
both before and after JSA. Of course this has the shortcoming that also
people who get IS for reasons other than unemployment (for example
since they have just low income) are counted as unemployment benefit
claimants. But it is not so problematic for our analysis, given that the
effect on search effort of the unemployment benefit may be similar to
that of income-related benefits, which may be lost as well when the
unemployed finds a job and his income rises.
Financial Situation
This variable captures a subjective evaluation of respondent financial
situation. Precisely it refers to the question: “How well would you
say you yourself are managing financially these days?”. The responses
may be five, where the higher is the number, the worse is the financial
situation: (1) Living comfortably; (2) Doing alright; (3) Just about
getting by; (4) Find it quite difficult; (5) Find it very difficult.
Age
The base age range in the regressions is 25-49, then we use dummies
for young (16-24) and elderly (50-64) people. The sample is restricted
to all people in working wage, that is 16-64 for males and 16-59 for
females.
Disability Benefits
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This is a dummy which selects people getting incapacity benefits or
severe disablement allowance. In 1996 the incapacity benefit assembled
under a unified system invalidity and sickness benefits.
Pension
This dummy takes one if respondent gets NI retirement pension or
private pension or annuity.
Full-time education
This dummy identifies people who are in full-time education.
Relation with head of household
This identifies the relation between the respondent and the head of
household. The BHPS uses the concept of Household Reference Per-
son (HRP), defined as the person legally or financially responsible for
the accommodation, or the eldest of two people equally responsible.
The head of household (hoh) is defined in general (for example by
the General Household Survey) as the principal owner or renter of the
property, where (if there is more than one) the male takes precedence,
and (if there is more than one potential hoh of the same sex) the el-
dest takes precedence. The BHPS HRP definition is similar except
that only the age criterion is used to distinguish multiple potential
HRPs. In our analysis we use the hoh definition which requires only
minor replacements by sex with respect to the HRP definition. We
identify three other categories: (1) lawful spouse or live-in partner; (2)
children: hoh’s child (natural, adopted, foster, step-child), partner’s
child, daughter/son-in-law, any grand-child, any nephew; (3) other liv-
ing within the household, whether or not member’s relatives. The base
group in the regressions is made of head of households, then we include
3 dummies in the regression to control for the other categories.
Duration since last job
We created five categories depending on time past since last occupation:
from now to 6 months ago, from 6 to 12 months, from 1 to 3 years,
from 3 years or more, and the last refers to people who have never had
a job. The base category in the regressions is the first.
Education
These are 7 levels of education attained: (1) first or higher degree; (2)
HND, HNC, teaching qualification; (3) GCE a level; (4) GCE o level;
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(5) cse; (6) other qualification; (7) no qualification. The base category
is the last.
Regional dummies
Regions are 19: (1) Inner London; (2) Outer London; (3) Rest of South
East; (4) South West; (5) East Anglia; (6) East Midlands; (7) West
Midlands Conurb (8) Rest of West Midlands; (9) Greater Manchester;
(10) Merseyside; (11) Rest of North West; (12) South Yorkshire; (13)
West Yorkshire; (14) Rest of Yorks & Humber; (15) Tyne & Wear; (16)
Rest of North; (17) Wales; (18) Scotland; (19) Northern Ireland.
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Table 1
Unemployed: search last week or last 4 weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 9.1** 7.6*
mortgager 11.2** 9.1*
outright owner 1.7 3.3
housing costs 3.1* 2.5
equivalized hh income 1.1 -0.0 0.7 -0.1
hh size 0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
dep. child -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6
claimant 18.3*** 18.9*** 18.4*** 18.8***
financial sit. 7.3*** 7.0*** 7.2*** 7.0***
female -8.8** -9.0*** -8.6** -8.9**
young (16-24) -7.1 -7.7 -7.3 -7.8
elderly (50-64) 7.7 8.3 9.3 9.0
disability benf. -26.0*** -25.4*** -25.9*** -25.4***
pension 46.0 46.8 46.4 46.8
full-time education -35.4*** -36.9*** -35.7*** -36.8***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner -0.6 -0.4 -0.8 -0.5
child 12.8** 14.4** 13.7** 14.6**
other 2.8 -3.7 3.1 0.3
duration since last job
6-12 months -15.2** -15.2** -15.2** -15.2**
1-3 years -21.3*** -20.6*** -21.0*** -20.5***
3 years or more -30.0*** -29.4*** -29.9*** -29.4***
never had job -11.5* -11.0* -11.4* -10.9*
education
1st degree or higher 21.9*** 22.2*** 22.5*** 22.8***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 14.1 12.9 14.4 13.3**
a level 12.1* 11.0* 12.3** 11.3*
o level 14.4*** 14.5*** 14.5*** 14.6***
cse 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.9
other qlf 2.3 1.7 2.3 1.8
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 7124 7062 7124 7062
ρ 9.8*** 9.1*** 9.8*** 9.1***
Notes:
1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2. The Table reports marginal effects (at regressors means) from the random effects probit. Coef-
ficients are expressed in percentage points, expect for housing costs and equivalized household
income for which we report semi-elasticities.
3. Sample: people in working age without job who searched in last four weeks. Dependent variable:
search in the last week or in the last four but not in the last. The last row reports the likelihood
ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the ρ statistic is the portion of variance of
the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualification.
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Table 2
Unemployed: search methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 14.3*** 13.1***
mortgager 17.3*** 15.3***
outright owner 3.8 6.7
housing costs 0.0** 0.0
equivalized hh income 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
hh size -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5
dep. child -5.9 -5.5 -6.5 -5.9
claimant 26.9*** 28.2*** 27.2*** 28.1***
financial sit. 10.2*** 10.1*** 10.1*** 10.0***
female -24.7*** -24.4*** -24.5*** -24.3***
young (16-24) 11.4** 11.1** 11.2** 11.0**
elderly (50-64) -17.9*** -15.9** -15.7** -14.8**
disability benf. -35.3*** -34.1*** -35.1*** -34.1***
pension 54.6** 55.0** 56.3** 55.8**
full-time education -44.6*** -45.2*** -44.9*** -45.1***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 5.9 5.4 5.7 5.4
child -11.4* -10.5* -10.2* -10.1
other -3.1 -6.1 -2.6 -5.2
duration since last job
6-12 months -26.4*** -25.9*** -26.4*** -26.1***
1-3 years -31.2*** -31.0*** -31.0*** -31.0***
3 years or more -56.3*** -55.2*** -56.1*** -55.3***
never had job -29.3*** -28.7*** -29.3*** -28.6***
education
1st degree or higher 24.9*** 24.8*** 26.0*** 25.7***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 15.3 13.5 16.1 14.2
a level 9.2 7.9 9.4 8.4
o level 11.0** 10.2* 11.2** 10.4*
cse -13.7** -14.2* -13.8* -14.3*
other qlf 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.0
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 4651 4591 4651 4591
ρ 19.0*** 18.0*** 19.1*** 18.1***
Notes:
1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2. The estimated model is a random effects ordered probit. The calculation is run by using the
reoprob Stata package. Reported coefficients are those of the index function thus do not have a
straight economic interpretation.
3. Sample: people in working age without job who searched in last four weeks. Dependent variable:
number of search methods, 6 categories (0-5). Since the question on search methods is asked only
since 1996, the sample shrinks to 12 waves, that is from 6 to 17 waves. The last row reports the
likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the ρ statistic is the portion of
variance of the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualification.
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Table 3
Unemployed: dummy for search methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 11.6** 10.5**
mortgager 12.2** 9.6*
outright owner 9.8 13.3
housing costs 3.6* 4.0*
equivalized hh income 3.0 1.9 2.9 1.9
hh size -1.2 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0
dep. child -10.2* -10.4* -10.3* -10.2*
claimant 34.6*** 35.5*** 34.6*** 35.5***
financial sit. 9.6*** 9.4*** 9.6*** 9.5***
female -26.8** -26.0*** -26.8*** -26.1***
young (16-24) 6.0 6.3 6.0 6.3
elderly (50-64) -16.0** -14.2* -15.6* -14.6*
disability benf. -31.1*** -31.4*** -31.1*** -31.4***
pension 60.1* 60.6* 60.3* 60.4*
full-time education -49.1*** -50.6*** -49.2*** -50.6***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 7.3 6.3 7.3 6.4
child -7.8 -7.8 -7.6 -8.0
other -1.9 -5.4 -1.8 -5.9
duration since last job
6-12 months -38.5*** -38.3*** -38.5*** -38.3***
1-3 years -34.5*** -34.1*** -34.5*** -34.0***
3 years or more -61.0*** -60.4*** -60.9*** -60.4***
never had job -31.6*** -30.6*** -31.6*** -30.6***
education
1st degree or higher 26.3*** 26.6*** 26.5*** 26.2***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 21.1* 19.5 21.2* 19.3
a level 11.4 10.0 11.4 9.8
o level 15.0** 14.8** 15.1** 14.7**
cse -18.1** -19.3** -18.2** -19.3**
other qlf -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 4651 4591 4651 4591
ρ 17.5*** 16.5*** 17.6*** 16.5***
Notes:
1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2. The Table reports marginal effects (at regressors means) from the random effects probit. Coef-
ficients are expressed in percentage points, expect for housing costs and equivalized household
income for which we report semi-elasticities.
3. Sample: people in working age without job who searched in last four weeks. Dependent variable:
dummy which takes 1 for numbers of methods between 3 and 5 and takes 0 for numbers between
0 and 2. As in Table 2 the sample includes only from 6 to 17 waves. The last row reports the
likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the ρ statistic is the portion of
variance of the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualification.
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Table 4
The Choice of Search
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 5.6* 5.0
mortgager 15.2*** 14.4***
outright owner -23.2*** -21.2***
housing costs 3.6*** 1.8**
equivalized hh income -4.7*** -5.6*** -6.1*** -6.3***
hh size -5.3*** -5.9*** -5.5*** -5.8***
dep. child -5.9* -5.1 -8.2*** -7.5**
claimant 51.6*** 52.8*** 51.1*** 52.0***
financial sit. 18.6*** 18.5*** 18.1*** 18.1***
female -69.6*** -69.0*** -69.7*** -69.2***
young (16-24) 35.4*** 35.7*** 34.5*** 35.1***
elderly (50-64) -77.7*** -75.3*** -70.5*** -69.6***
disability benf. -94.7*** -94.8*** -95.4*** -95.7***
pension -42.9*** -41.3*** -38.4*** -37.7***
full-time education -98.7*** -100.9*** -100.4*** -101.8***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 5.5 4.6 3.9 3.3
child 65.0*** 67.1*** 67.9*** 68.7***
other 31.5*** 27.0*** 31.6*** 29.4***
duration since last job
6-12 months -28.6*** -28.6*** -28.4*** -28.5***
1-3 years -70.9*** -70.7*** -69.8*** -70.0***
3 years or more -99.6*** -99.2*** -98.9*** -98.8***
never had job -65.9*** -65.8*** -65.0*** -65.1***
education
1st degree or higher 47.3*** 45.9*** 49.5*** 48.6***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 32.2*** 33.1*** 33.7*** 34.9***
a level 21.8*** 20.1*** 22.5*** 21.7***
o level 31.8*** 30.9*** 31.5*** 31.0***
cse 18.0*** 17.8*** 17.2*** 17.4***
other qlf 8.5 8.9 8.7 9.2
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 40184 39876 40184 39876
ρ 40.7*** 40.6*** 40.6*** 40.6***
Notes:
1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2. The Table reports marginal effects (at regressors means) from the random effects probit. Coef-
ficients are expressed in percentage points, expect for housing costs and equivalized household
income for which we report semi-elasticities.
3. Sample: all people in working age without job. Dependent variable: dummy which takes 1 if
searched in last four weeks and 0 if not. The last row reports the likelihood ratio test for the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the ρ statistic is the portion of variance of the composite
error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualification.
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Table 5
FT education, retirement pension, disability benefits
all sample FT educ pension disab. ben.
freq. % freq. % freq. % freq. %
employed 124,699 74.8% 4,893 40.3% 542 42.6% 1,089 11.9%
unemployed 7,411 4.5% 1,130 9.3% 34 2.7% 346 3.8%
inactive 34,532 20.7% 6,113 50.4% 695 54.7% 7,730 84.3%
Total 166,642 100% 12,136 100% 1,271 100% 9,165 100%
Notes:
1. The sample refers to all 17 waves and is made of all respondents in working age.
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Table 6
Non-employed: search last week, search last 4 weeks or no search
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 6.7** 5.9**
mortgager 15.9*** 14.8***
outright owner -21.2*** -19.2***
housing costs 0.0*** 0.0***
equivalized hh income -0.0*** -0.0*** -0.0*** -0.0***
hh size -4.9*** -5.5*** -5.1*** -5.5***
dep. child -4.9 -4.1 -7.0** -6.3**
claimant 50.3*** 51.6*** 49.9*** 50.8***
financial sit. 18.5*** 18.4*** 18.0*** 18.0***
female -65.6*** -65.1*** -65.6*** -65.1***
young (16-24) 31.0*** 31.1*** 30.2*** 30.6***
elderly (50-64) -73.5*** -71.1*** -66.4*** -65.6***
disability benf. -92.0*** -92.1*** -92.7*** -93.0***
pension -40.0*** -38.4*** -35.6*** -35.0***
full-time education -94.7*** -96.9*** -96.2*** -98.0***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 4.2 3.3 2.7 2.2
child 61.0*** 63.2*** 63.7*** 64.6***
other 28.0*** 23.3*** 28.0*** 25.5***
duration since last job
6-12 months -27.7*** -27.6*** -27.5*** -27.6***
1-3 years -68.1*** -67.8*** -67.0*** -67.1***
3 years or more -97.0*** -96.4*** -96.1*** -96.0***
never had job -61.8*** -61.6*** -61.0*** -60.9***
education
1st degree or higher 48.1*** 46.8*** 50.2*** 49.4***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 33.5*** 34.0*** 34.9*** 35.8***
a level 23.8*** 22.2*** 24.4*** 23.5***
o level 32.8*** 31.9*** 32.4*** 31.9***
cse 17.8*** 17.7*** 17.0*** 17.2***
other qlf 9.0 9.3 9.3 9.7
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 40236 39927 40236 39927
ρ 39.2*** 39.0*** 39.0*** 39.1***
Notes:
1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2. The estimated model is a random effects ordered probit. The calculation is run by using the
reoprob Stata package. Reported coefficients are those of the index function thus do not have a
straight economic interpretation.
3. Sample: all non-employed people in working age. The dependent variable is ordinal with three
categories: search in the last week, search in the last four but not in the last, no search in the last
four. The last row reports the likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity;
the ρ statistic is the portion of variance of the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved
heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualification.
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Table 7
Non-employed: search methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 7.2** 6.2*
mortgager 16.8*** 15.4***
outright owner -21.4*** -18.1***
housing costs 0.0*** 0.0**
equivalized hh income -0.0** -0.0*** -0.0*** -0.0***
hh size -5.1*** -5.8*** -5.4*** -5.8***
dep. child -4.9 -4.0 -6.9** -6.0*
claimant 45.8*** 48.1*** 45.4*** 47.0***
financial sit. 19.5*** 19.3*** 18.9*** 18.9***
female -62.1*** -61.4*** -62.2*** -61.4***
young (16-24) 35.4*** 35.0*** 34.2*** 34.4***
elderly (50-64) -72.2*** -68.2*** -64.8*** -63.4***
disability benf. -88.5*** -88.2*** -89.0*** -89.1***
pension -45.9*** -43.2*** -40.9*** -40.0***
full-time education -85.5*** -87.5*** -86.6*** -87.4***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 3.5 2.3 2.0 1.5
child 45.2*** 47.7*** 47.8*** 48.4***
other 22.1*** 15.3* 22.2*** 19.0**
duration since last job
6-12 months -29.4*** -28.9*** -29.0*** -28.8***
1-3 years -68.2*** -67.4*** -67.1*** -67.0***
3 years or more -101.7*** -100.3*** -100.9*** -100.1***
never had job -68.6*** -67.8*** -67.4*** -67.0***
education
1st degree or higher 53.2*** 51.3*** 55.4*** 54.3***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 31.1*** 30.8*** 32.6*** 32.9***
a level 23.9*** 21.7*** 24.4*** 23.3***
o level 33.8*** 32.6*** 33.8*** 33.1***
cse 10.5* 10.5* 10.3* 10.5*
other qlf 8.8 9.1 9.1 9.5
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 30639 30344 30639 30344
ρ 38.0*** 37.7*** 37.7*** 37.6***
Notes:
1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2. The estimated model is a random effects ordered probit. The calculation is run by using the
reoprob Stata package. Reported coefficients are those of the index function thus do not have a
straight economic interpretation.
3. Sample: all non-employed people in working age. Dependent variable: number of search methods,
6 categories (0-5). As in Table 2 and 3 the sample includes only from 6 to 17 waves. The last row
reports the likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the ρ statistic is the
portion of variance of the composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualification.
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Table 8
Non-employed: dummy for search methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owner (out. or mort.) 10.2** 8.9**
mortgager 18.3*** 16.2***
outright owner -13.5** -10.0*
housing costs 5.5*** 3.3**
equivalized hh income -2.3 -4.2* -3.4 -4.3*
hh size -5.4*** -6.0*** -5.7*** -6.0***
dep. child -11.5*** -11.0*** -13.1*** -12.5***
claimant 54.7*** 56.5*** 54.4*** 55.7***
financial sit. 19.5*** 19.3*** 19.0*** 19.0***
female -65.1*** -64.1*** -65.1*** -64.2***
young (16-24) 28.1*** -28.1*** 27.0*** 27.6***
elderly (50-64) -63.1*** -59.2*** -56.9*** -55.4***
disability benf. -87.4*** -87.4*** -87.8*** -88.1***
pension -31.0* -28.5* -26.7 -25.8
full-time education -96.7*** -99.7*** -97.6*** -99.5***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner 7.8* 6.5 6.6 5.8
child 36.7*** 38.7*** 39.1*** 39.5***
other 27.2*** 20.2** 27.5*** 23.3**
duration since last job
6-12 months -43.1*** -42.5*** -42.6*** -42.4***
1-3 years -72.1*** -71.5*** -71.3*** -71.1***
3 years or more -114.1*** -112.8*** -113.4*** -112.8***
never had job -73.3*** -72.0*** -72.2*** -71.4***
education
1st degree or higher 53.9*** 52.4*** 55.8*** 54.8***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 33.3*** 33.3*** 34.5*** 34.8***
a level 26.9*** 24.8*** 27.3*** 25.9***
o level 34.7*** 33.9*** 34.9*** 34.4***
cse 3.0 2.4 3.0 2.6
other qlf 9.0 9.1 9.4 9.5
regional dummies X X X X
time dummies X X X X
number of observations 30639 30344 30639 30344
ρ 32.4*** 32.0*** 32.1*** 31.9***
Notes:
1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2. The Table reports marginal effects (at regressors means) from the random effects probit. Coef-
ficients are expressed in percentage points, expect for housing costs and equivalized household
income for which we report semi-elasticities.
3. Sample: all non-employed people in working age. Dependent variable: dummy which takes 1 for
numbers of methods between 3 and 5 and takes 0 for numbers between 0 and 2. As in Table 2,
3 and 7 the sample includes only from 6 to 17 waves. The last row reports the likelihood ratio
test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity; the ρ statistic is the portion of variance of the
composite error due to the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4. For dummies which capture the relation with the head of household, the omitted category is just
the head of household; for duration since last job dummies it is from 0 to 6 months ago; for
education dummies it is no qualification.
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Table 9
Mortgagers vs Outright vs Social Renters vs Private Renters
unemployed non-employed
I II III IV V
last week, search the choice last week, search
last 4 weeks methods of search last 4 weeks, methods
no search
mortgager 12.3** 17.0*** 4.0 5.5 6.3
outright owner 7.0 8.6 -32.4*** -29.1*** -28.2***
social renters 4.9 2.6 -16.1*** -14.4*** -14.3***
housing costs 2.7 0.0* 1.4* 0.0** 0.0**
equivalized hh income -0.1 -0.0 -6.2*** -0.0*** -0.0***
hh size -0.1 -0.6 -5.8*** -5.4*** -5.7***
dep. child -1.1 -6.2 -5.9* -4.9 -4.7
claimant 18.8*** 28.1*** 52.4*** 51.1*** 47.3***
financial sit. 7.0*** 10.1*** 18.2*** 18.0*** 18.9***
female -8.8** -24.2*** -69.2*** -65.2*** -61.5***
young (16-24) -7.4 11.1** 34.0*** 29.6*** 33.5***
elderly (50-64) 8.6 -15.0** -68.6*** -64.7*** -62.6***
disability benf. -25.6*** -34.2*** -95.3*** -92.5*** -88.7***
pension 46.8 55.7** -37.9*** -35.0*** -40.2***
full-time education -36.1*** -44.8*** -103.7*** -99.2*** -88.9***
relation with HoH
spouse or live-in partner -0.6 5.3 3.4 2.3 1.6
child 13.8** -10.5* 71.5*** 67.1*** 50.6***
other 0.7 -5.0 27.3*** 23.7*** 17.5**
duration since last job
6-12 months -15.3** -26.1*** -28.5*** -27.6*** -28.8***
1-3 years -20.5*** -31.0*** -70.0*** -67.1*** -67.0***
3 years or more -29.5*** -55.3*** -98.4*** -95.7*** -99.9***
never had job -10.9* -28.6*** -65.2*** -61.1*** -67.2***
education
1st degree or higher 23.6*** 26.2*** 45.9*** 46.9*** 52.0***
hnd, hnc, teaching qf 13.8 14.5 33.0*** 34.1*** 31.1***
a level 11.8** 8.6 19.5*** 21.6*** 21.5***
o level 14.8*** 10.6* 29.9*** 31.0*** 31.1***
cse 5.1 -14.2** 16.9*** 16.8*** 10.2
other qlf 1.9 2.1 8.5 8.5 8.9
regional dummies X X X X X
time dummies X X X X X
number of observations 7062 4591 39876 39927 30344
ρ 9.0*** 18.1*** 40.6*** 39.0*** 37.5***
Notes:
1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2. For model I and III, coefficients reported are marginal effects evaluated at means, for the other
models they are straight coefficients of the index function.
3. Model I: see Table 1; model II: see Table 2; model III: see Table 4; model IV: see Table 6; model
V: see Table 7.
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